AGENT-BASED SIMULATION OF ELECTRICITY MARKETS
-A LITERATURE REVIEW-

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ABSTRACT

Liberalisation, climate policy and promotion of renewable energy are challenges to players of the electricity sector in many countries. Policy makers have to consider issues like market power, bounded rationality of players and the appearance of fluctuating energy sources in order to provide adequate legislation. Furthermore the interactions between markets and environmental policy instruments become an issue of increasing importance. A promising approach for the scientific analysis of these developments is the field of agent-based simulation. The goal of this article is to provide an overview of the current work applying this methodology to the analysis of electricity markets.

Keywords:
electricity markets, agent-based simulation, computational economics

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1. Introduction

The electricity sector in Europe and North America is undergoing considerable changes. The liberalisation of electricity markets, climate policy and the promotion of renewable energy change the framework conditions of this formerly strictly regulated field. The outages of electricity supply in California, USA, in 2001 and the blackout on August 14, 2003 leaving 50 million people without electricity in parts of Canada and the USA (U.S.-Canada Power System Outage Task Force, 2004) have changed the way electricity markets are regarded. Based on these circumstances new questions arise: How can liberalised markets be developed without endangering the security of supply? How can the efficiency of market mechanisms be ensured in an environment with only few players? Which policies are adequate to ensure environmental goals like climate protection and promotion of renewable energy under market conditions? In order to deal with these issues new scientific tools for the analysis of developments in the electricity sector have to be developed. A promising approach is the development of agent-based simulations.

Before entering into a discussion of the different modelling approaches of the electricity sector it may be valuable to describe some of the major characteristics of electricity markets. One central aspect of electricity is that it is rather difficult to store in large quantities. Another important aspect is that the stable operation of the electricity grid requires that electricity demand and supply are always in balance. This situation requires that there is always enough generation capacity to satisfy demand. Therefore it is common that the grid operators who are responsible for the stability of the grid, purchase balancing capacity in order to be able to balance the grid in case of unforeseen developments such as plant outages. If the gap between electricity demand and supply exceeds the available balancing capacity, the entire electricity system can break down. Therefore it is important to ensure that the electricity system creates enough generation and grid capacity, in order to ensure the stability of the system in the long run. In the given context it is also important to note that the infrastructure of the electricity sector, consisting of the electricity grid and the generation capacity, is rather expensive. This leads to the situation that electricity markets are, in many cases, dominated by a limited number of players. As consequence, the policy makers or regulators face the problem that the electricity system has to create enough incentives to build enough infrastructure, in terms of generation capacity and transmission capacity, without creating exaggerated profits for the oligopoly of players owning the generation capacity.

In general three major bottom-up approaches to model electricity markets can be distinguished: optimisation models, equilibrium models and simulation models (Ventosa et al., 2005). In most cases, agent-based simulations can be classified as simulation models, although some agent-based models try to integrate routines from other approaches, such as optimisation models for the optimal utilisation of a power plant portfolio (see Scheidt, 2002). In addition, Computable general equilibrium [CGE] models, or other macroeconomic modelling approaches, are mainly used for the top-down analysis of macroeconomic developments of the sector. In most cases they apply a high level of aggregation, which lacks the detail level necessary to analyse short term developments on electricity markets which are heavily influenced by technical detail and player interactions. A common application of optimisation models in the electricity sector is the capacity expansion planning of public utilities. Despite their capability to integrate a high level of detail, these models lack the capability to integrate player interactions, especially if the players deviate from the principle of pure financial profit maximization. A central strength of the agent-based simulation models is...
the possibility to deviate from “normative” equilibrium conditions or strategies. As an example the modelling approaches stated above are not suitable to analyse the development of electricity prices for households in a liberalized electricity market because households apply a different rationale (Bakay and Schwaiger 2004; Price 2003).

Based on these considerations agent-based simulation models have experienced an increasing popularity amongst electricity market modellers. This development can be explained by the additional opportunities that this modelling paradigm offers for the analysis of economic systems, as compared to more traditional equilibrium models or optimisation models. Aspects like learning effects in repeated interactions, asymmetric information, imperfect competition, or strategic interaction and collusion can be included in a more realistic way in agent-based models. Also, the interaction structure and the agents’ individual behaviour can be specified more freely as compared to optimisation and equilibrium models. Increasingly powerful computational resources as well as the development of toolkits\(^1\) that facilitate the implementation of agent-based models in object-oriented programming languages have further pushed applications of agent-based simulation. The concept of agent-based simulation has the potential to become a valuable modelling approach in addition to existing tools that are already used for the analysis of the electricity sector. However, the concept is very demanding in its data requirements and empirical validation is a crucial issue to be dealt with in order to reach a high level realism.

With flexibility being one of the central advantages of agent-based simulation, this is also reflected in the diversity of definitions. While there are some commonly quoted definitions of the term “agent” in the field of software engineering (Wooldridge and Jennings, 1995; Wooldridge, 2002; Franklin and Grasser 1997) a review of existing agent-based simulation models by Drogoul et al. (Drogoul, et al., 2002) shows that those simulations use a “weak” notion of agents at the metaphorical or conceptual level. In these cases, agents constitute a convenient model for representing autonomous entities without being themselves autonomous in the resulting implementation of these models (Drogoul, Vanbergue and Meurisse, 2002). The same is true for the research field of Agent-based Computational Economics, where the term “agent” broadly refers to bundled data and behavioural methods representing an entity that constitutes a part of a computationally constructed world (Tesfatsion 2006). As examples of possible agents, Tesfatsion mentions individuals, social groupings, institutions, or biological and physical entities. Thus, she states, agents can range from active data-gathering decision-makers with sophisticated learning capabilities to passive world features with no cognitive functioning.

The aim of this paper is to provide an overview of the recent work in the field of agent-based simulation of electricity markets. Due to the dynamic development of this research area, the presented review can not ensure completeness. However, care has been taken to include the most relevant works that are known to the authors. Since the field of agent-based simulation of electricity markets is new, the review is extended beyond the literature that is available in Journals in order to provide an adequate picture of recent research. The presented review should provide a helpful guidance through the literature with pointers to ongoing

\(^1\) For a comparison of different agent toolkits, the reader is referred to a detailed evaluation of four Java libraries for agent-based simulation in the social sciences, prepared by Tobias and Hofmann (2004). Other helpful pointers are given in a paper by Gilbert and Bankes 2002 and in a review of software products by Mangina 2002.
projects\(^2\), especially to newcomers in agent-based electricity market modelling. In order to provide a structure for the literature survey, the reviewed papers are grouped into three main categories of ongoing research:

1. Analysis of market power and design;
2. Modelling agent decisions;
3. Coupling of long term and short term decisions.

The paper is structured accordingly. Within these main categories some major subcategories have been identified. In the case of market analysis the number and actual features of implemented markets plays a major role, starting from a single market up to multiple markets or the integration of markets for other commodities such as gas. Other subcategories are the integration of players and transmission constraints. The actual concept or implementation varies within the literature. However, there is a common tendency towards increasing complexity of the described models. An overview of the features that can be identified in the reviewed literature, is given in Figure 1.

![Figure 1: Overview of main categories and different contributions of ongoing research](image)

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\(^2\) A very good resource on the latest projects and papers in agent-based electricity market modeling is also a website maintained and regularly updated by Leigh Tesfatsion: [http://www.econ.iastate.edu/tesfatsi/aelect.htm](http://www.econ.iastate.edu/tesfatsi/aelect.htm)
However, it has to be pointed out that there is some overlap between these categories (see also Figure 2 with selected examples). Some parts of the reviewed papers may have contributed to more than one of these categories, or to additional research questions. In these cases the papers have been classified according to best knowledge of the authors. Another aspect considered in the classification of single papers, is the goal to show the contributions of a given research group within one section wherever possible, in order to enable the reader to get an impression of the model development trends over time. The final section of the paper contains a summary and some concluding remarks.

Figure 2:
Overview of the main research categories in the reviewed literature

![Diagram of research categories]

1. Chapter 2.1 e.g. (Bower and Bunn, 2000)
2. Chapter 3.1 e.g. (Koesrindarto, 2002)
3. Chapter 3.2 e.g. (Visudhiphan, 2003)
4. Chapter 4.1 e.g. (Conzelmann et al. 2004)

(own visualisation)

2. MODELS TO ANALYSE MARKET POWER AND MARKET DESIGN

The current work focussing on market design is mainly triggered by the restructuring of electricity markets in the USA and Europe. This section introduces the work carried out at London Business School, Iowa State University, Los Alamos National Laboratory and a series of papers by Ilic and Visudhiphan as remarkable examples of the ongoing research. An overview of the main categories and the analysed papers is given in Figure 3.
2. Market power & design

2.1 Evolution to multiple markets
- **Single market**
  - Day and Bunn 2001; Bunn and Day 2002
  - Bower and Bunn 2000;
  - Bower and Bunn 2001
  - Bower et al. 2001
- **Spotmarket + Balancing power market**
  - Bunn and Oliveira 2001;
  - Bunn and Oliveira 2003
  - Bunn and Martoccia, 2005
- **Including the gas market**
  - Bunn and Nicola, 2005

2.2 Measuring market efficiency
- **Analysis of supply bidding**
  - Visudhiphan and Ilić 1999
  - Visudhiphan and Ilić 2001
  - Visudhiphan and Ilić 2002
- **Active Demand & learning**
  - Visudhiphan 2003
- **Congested grids**
  - Ernst et al. 2004

2.3 Market efficiency in congested grids
- **Assigned capacity**
  - Nicolaisen et al. 2000
  - Nicolaisen et al. 2001
- **DC power flow + optimal powerflow**
  - Koesrindartoto and Tesfatsion 2004
  - Koesrindartoto et al. 2005

2.4 Market design: Linking simulation models
- Atkins et al., 2004a
- Atkins et al., 2004b

(own visualisation)

2.1 Analysis of the market power of utilities: Evolution to multi-market models

One of the pioneers in the field of agent-based simulation of the electricity sector is a research team at London Business School. Day and Bunn (Day and Bunn, 2001) describe a simulation where generation companies bid their individual piece-wise linear supply function in a market with uniform price market clearing. The generation companies are modelled as daily profit maximizers who assume that the competitors bid the same supply function as they did in the previous day. In addition to the profits obtained from electricity sales, companies can also earn revenue from so-called contracts for differences, i.e. financial hedging contracts that they engage in with buyers of electricity. Each company selects its best action through an iterative optimization routine that calculates the supply function that the company bids into the pool market\(^3\) with respect to mentioned conjecture about the opponent’s actions and a given volume of contracts for differences. Electricity demand is represented by an aggregate

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\(^3\) The wholesale trading of electricity can be based on two different markets. In pool market bids and asks are collected by a market operator who applies a central market clearing mechanism to determine market prices. Another option are bilateral contracts where two parties negotiate volumes and prices. Bilateral trades are also called “over the counter [OTC] trades”.

demand function with a defined slope. Day and Bunn evaluate their model by comparing the supply functions obtained from the computational model with the equilibrium in continuous supply functions that would be obtained through the approach formulated by Klemperer and Meyer (1989). A central finding is that the results are reassuringly close in the studied scenario, which models competition between the three largest fossil fuel generating companies in the England and Wales pool. They conclude that the computational approach can also deliver realistic results for more complex scenarios that cannot be represented in the analytical supply function equilibrium model. The computational model is then applied to analyze different options for the second round of plant divestiture in England and Wales in 1999. In the simulation runs the demand slope and the volume of contracts for differences are varied. Their results show that the analysed divestment options result in lower average percentage bids above marginal cost. But, the authors conclude, the proposed divestiture still leaves market power with generators in the short term, and could result in prices more than 20% above short-run marginal costs.

In a later paper the authors (Bunn and Day, 2002) present this model as a competitive benchmark against which to assess generator conduct and to diagnose the separate causes of market structure and market conduct in situations where prices appear to be above marginal costs. For the tested scenarios the simulated system supply functions are above the marginal cost function and significantly below the system supply curve observed in the England and Wales pool on an exemplary day, except at low demand levels. This leads the authors to the conclusion that the extent to which the simulated supply functions are above the marginal cost function is caused by the market structure. Based on the fact that the observed system supply functions in the real-world market are still above the simulated system supply functions, Bunn and Day conclude that there is collusion within the market, thus identifying a problem of market conduct.

Bower and Bunn present an agent-based simulation of the England and Wales electricity market in the year 2000 (Bower and Bunn, 2000). The simulation is designed to compare different market mechanisms. Examples are the comparison of daily bids versus hourly bids and the comparison of uniform price and discriminatory settlement. In the given simulation, generation agents bid on a single electricity market. The electricity demand is modelled by a price inelastic aggregate demand curve. Agents are endowed with a simple reinforcement learning algorithm which is driven by the goal to maximise profits and to reach a given utilisation rate of a power plant. The agents can choose between four strategies, e.g. lowering prices when the expected utilisation is not met. Since bids are calculated for every plant, generation companies with more plants get more insights into the market. The memory of the agents is limited to two days. A more detailed discussion of the results of an application of this model can be found in Bower and Bunn, 2001. The results of the agent-based simulation show that the discriminatory settlement leads to higher prices than the uniform price settlement. Another finding is that a shift to hourly bidding leads to higher prices which can be explained by the fact that the inelastic demand helps the generation companies to reach high market prices in peak demand periods. In a next step, the simulation results are compared to classical economic models of monopoly, duopoly and perfect competition, supporting the simulation outcomes with regard to the comparison of uniform and discriminatory settlement.

In Bower et al., 2001, an application of the developed model for the simulation of the German electricity sector is described. Thereby the German market is simulated as a day-
ahead bilateral market with simultaneous bidding and pay as bid market clearing. The demand is represented by an aggregate demand curve. Transmission constraints or costs are neglected. In the given case study the impact of the mergers between RWE/VEW and Preussen Electra/Bayernwerk, creating Germany’s biggest electricity utilities, is analysed in different simulation settings including plant closures and lower utilisation targets for power plants. In these scenarios electricity prices rise considerably as an effect of the mergers. A remarkable aspect of this paper is that the authors compare their simulation results with the available market data in a graphical way. Although this comparison shows the difficulties in reproducing volatile real world markets, this process of validating simulation results by a comparison of the real world prices, may lead to more acceptance for this modelling approach.

An extension of the agent-based simulation is described by Bunn and Oliveira (Bunn and Oliveira, 2001). The given paper explicitly models electricity demand as actively bidding supplier agents. Supply-agents are characterized by a given market share, contract cover, a given retail price, the mean prediction error in forecasting the contracted load, and a search propensity which indicates the agents willingness to search for new strategies. The supplier agents are driven by the goal to maximize daily profits while keeping balancing market exposure caused by insufficient contract cover close to a target value. Another enhancement of the model is a more detailed simulation of the supply-side by integrating plant cycles and availability into the generator characteristics. Other aspects like contract cover, search propensity and goals are similar to the supply agents. The extended model incorporates the balancing power market as an additional market. Both markets are modelled as sequential markets. Trading takes place on a day-ahead basis for single hours. The balancing power market is executed after the power exchange generators and suppliers are allowed to bid on the balancing markets in order to correct load prediction or missing contract cover.

In a case study Bunn and Oliveira (Bunn and Oliveira, 2003) use the developed model in order to analyse whether two generation companies on the UK electricity market are capable of increasing their profits by manipulating market prices. They can show that in a one shot Bertrand game, generators are capable of reaching prices above marginal cost. Unilateral capacity withholding leads to increased profits. Based on these results Bunn and Oliveira argue that profit margins are not a good indicator to evaluate market power abuse and they state that learning in repeated games has to be taken into account. In order to reach more realistic results, the developed agent-based simulation is applied for an analysis of the England and Wales electricity market in the year 2000. The simulation is carried out for six typical demand profiles and six predefined strategies for the two generators. Results of the simulation runs indicate that only one generator is capable of increasing power exchange prices unilaterally. In order to manipulate prices profitably both generation companies have to act together. However, prices on the balancing market seem to be more robust against manipulation from both players. Based on these results the authors argue that additional

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4 In order to keep the frequency of the electricity grid at a constant level electricity demand and supply have to be balanced continuously. In order to ensure the stability of the electricity grid in case of unforeseen events such as plant outages the grid operators has to use balancing capacity. The purchase of balancing capacity can take place on separate balancing markets.

5 Bertrand games and Cournot games are standard models applied in game theory. In case of Cournot models the only decision variable for players on the market is the quantity bid into the market. In case of Bertrand games the price is the only decision variable for players. Supply function models try to combine both approaches by creating a supply function which is a combination of price and quantity.
insights can be gained in repeated games using agent learning algorithms to explore phenomena like implicit collusion.

Recently the described model has been applied to the analysis of market power on the electricity market in England and Wales (Bunn and Martoccia, 2005). A new direction of research seeks to extend the developed simulation platform for the analysis of the impact of crossholdings and vertical integration. Thereby the analysis of the gas to power value chain is within the centre of research. A new challenge is the simulation of two markets for different commodities (Micola et al., 2006).

2.2 Using agent-based simulation to measure market efficiency

Another group contributing to the field of agent-based simulation of electricity markets is a group led by Marija Ilić. In (Visudhiphan and Ilić, 1999) where a first agent-based simulation of electricity markets is presented. It simulates a spot market with uniform-price market clearing. Electricity demand is modelled by a price-elastic demand curve. The supply side is represented by generator agents bidding on the spot market based on information on their marginal cost and the available capacity. Generators can either pursue a profit maximization strategy or enter a competition to be a baseload generator.

Bids can either be submitted as a linear supply function or a single step supply function for one day. In case studies the model is tested with three generators on a day-ahead market and an hour-ahead market. The resulting prices in the hour-ahead market tend to be lower than in the day-ahead market. In general the elasticity of electricity demand has considerable impact on the ability of generators to exercise market power.

In their second paper on an agent-based spot market model, Visudhiphan and Ilić (Visudhiphan and Ilić 2001) report on simulation results from a model in which adaptive agents can show strategic behaviour and learn to improve their bids. The research question is the analysis of market power in an electricity spot market. In the described model, the agents’ decision process is composed of the bidding quantity determination and the subsequent bidding price determination. Agents strategically withhold capacity when their expected profit, after withholding, is higher than without withholding. As for the bid price setting decision, several strategies are proposed and each agent is assigned one strategy at the beginning of the simulation.

Agents have complete knowledge of the forecasted total load and of the system marginal cost function. Each agent records data about the market outcome in previous market rounds. The outcomes are each mapped to predefined discrete load ranges, so that each agent’s memory can be represented as a matrix with rows corresponding to the different load ranges and columns corresponding to the market rounds. Agents also distinguish whether the resulting market price in one round is a result of strategic or competitive behaviour, and store this information likewise. On the basis of the stored market data, six strategies for setting the marginal-unit bidding price for the next round are defined.

Simulation results are presented for two scenarios of available capacity. For each of the capacity scenarios, strategic and competitive (i.e. marginal-cost) prices are compared. Visudhiphan and Ilić come to the conclusion that generators are able to raise market prices if

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6 In contrast to an inelastic demand curve the price-elastic demand curve shows a price sensitivity of electricity demand. In case of higher market prices electricity demand is lower.
they bid strategically. This is observed not only for hours of high electricity demand but also for low-demand hours. However, a distinction between the success of different price or quantity bidding strategies is not made in the presented paper.

In a later paper the same authors (Visudhiphan and Ilić 2002) describe an enhanced electricity market model in the form of a dynamic bidding game. This model comprises different time scales, i.e. short-term (bidding strategies), medium-term (maintenance scheduling), and long-term (new entry, shut-down and merger) horizons. In order to make the model manageable, the three levels of short, medium and long-term decisions by the agents are assumed to be fully separable and are formally described as maximisation problems. In the same way as in the previous paper, the short-term bidding strategy is split into the quantity determination and a subsequent price determination.

As an ultimate aim of their work, the authors of the presented paper state a meaningful quantifiable market efficiency measure, which accounts for the electricity-related complexities, the available information, and the particularities of market structures. The agent-based approach is supposed to help to distinguish situations in which market power has been exerted from situations where effects of technical constraints might have raised market prices. The decision problems formulated in the presented paper are one element in this work in progress; simulation results are not reported in the paper.

In Visudhiphan 2003 an agent-based simulation platform is presented where power-producing agents with non-uniform portfolios and load serving entities engage in an electricity market with uniform clearing or discriminatory clearing. Several learning algorithms are tested with different parameters to show the impact on the simulated price dynamics. An own learning algorithm is introduced which incorporates a capacity withholding strategy and a memory for past market developments. The analysis shows that learning algorithms have a considerable impact on the result. The validation of the agent-based simulation with real market data is discussed but Visudhiphan points out that most of the data necessary to replicate real world conditions, such as plant outages, is confidential and draws the conclusion that a numerical validation is not possible in the given case. The agent-based simulation is applied to compare the impact of uniform and discriminatory pricing markets on market results with different learning algorithms. The result is heavily influenced by the learning algorithm but the discriminatory pricing tends to have a higher market price which is in compliance with the results obtained by Bower and Bunn (2001). In another application of the model the impact of an active load serving entity representing electricity demand is analysed. The results show that active demand bidding with price elastic electricity demand can limit the capability of power generators to raise prices.

Another agent-based simulation, integrating grid constraints\(^7\), is presented by Ernst et al. (Ernst et al., 2004). In the given simulation, electricity demand is integrated by a load agent with inelastic electricity demand. Generators and load agents are connected to a two node power system. Market clearing is implemented as a linear programming problem with the goal to satisfy electricity demand at the lowest cost. Grid constraints can lead to higher prices in congested regions of the grid. In a case study, the simulation is applied to analyse the impact of congestion and additional generation capacity. Therefore simulations are run with two and

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\(^7\) The electricity grid is designed for a given power flow. In the case where the power flow, which would result from trades on the electricity markets, is higher than the physical capacity of the electricity grid, the physical capacity of the electricity grid is constrained to the electricity market. In the case where the electricity grid is a bottleneck, electricity prices can vary depending on grid region.
three generators respectively, with and without grid constraints and with grid congestion. In another simulation the impact of aggregating several generators to a generation portfolio is analysed. The results show that this aggregation increases the generators’ capability to exercise market power. But the simulation runs with grid constraints show that congestion can change the market power of single agents, or even a generation portfolio, considerably.

2.3 Analysis of market efficiency in congested electricity grids

The research at Iowa State University has made considerable contributions to the field of agent-based simulation of electricity markets. These contributions range from the analysis of market power to the analysis of agent learning (see also 0).

An overview of the EPRI Power market simulator developed at Iowa State University is presented by Nicolaisen (Nicolaisen et al. 2000). In the presented simulation, distribution companies representing demand and generation companies take part in a double sided discriminatory auction. The matching algorithm matches the highest bids with the lowest asks, and chooses the contract price as the midpoint of each matched bid and ask pair. Buyers are characterized by a buying capacity, a revenue per MWh sold to their customers and fixed costs which are set to zero. Sellers are characterized by a maximum selling capacity, variable costs per MWh and fixed costs which are set to zero. Another feature of the model is the integration of grid constraints. Each agent is assigned a certain amount of available transmission capacity. The central goal of each agent is to maximize profits. Similar to the earlier work presented by Richter and Sheblé 1998, a genetic algorithm for social learning is applied which is based on the profit of the last auction. In a case study, the described model is used to assess the impact of relative concentration in terms of players and capacity on the market results. In the given experiment the hypothesis that market power is dependent on relative player or capacity concentration could not be supported, which is mainly ascribed to the simple genetic learning algorithm. As a consequence, the use of an individual learning algorithm for a closer representation of real world behaviour is proposed.

An extension of the model is described by Nicolaisen et al. (Nicolaisen et al. 2001). One goal of the development is to provide a tool that helps to distinguish the effect of market structure and agent learning on market power in a simulation. For a closer representation of human behaviour, a new learning algorithm is developed. The developed algorithm is a slight modification of the learning algorithm presented by Roth and Erev (Roth and Erev, 1995; Erev and Roth, 1998). It is a three parameter reinforcement learning algorithm that integrates the effect of experimentation and forgetting. The developed model is applied to test the impact of relative concentration on market outcomes. One tested hypothesis is that the overall aggregate profit of all market participants is nearly independent of market power effects. Again the impact of relative concentration could not be proven. However, the hypothesis on market efficiency, in terms of overall profits, shows some support but depends on the applied learning parameters.

A further agent-based simulation framework called AMES (Agent-based Modelling of Electricity Systems) is presented by Koesrindartoto et al. (Koesrindartoto and Tesfatsion, 2004; Koesrindartoto et al., 2005). The system is developed to allow intensive reliability and efficiency testing of the Wholesale Power Market Platform (WPMP), which has been proposed for common adoption by all U.S. wholesale power markets. The simulation model integrates the salient aspects of the WPMP, such as multi settlements (day-ahead and real-
time) and locational marginal price (LMP) calculations. The transmission grid underlying the market is approximated by a DC optimal power flow problem with linearised constraints. The formulation of the transmission grid representation is carefully described in Sun and Tesfatsion 2006. The research focus of the AMES framework is the complex interplay among structural conditions, market protocols, and learning behaviours in relation to short-term and longer-term market performance.

2.4 Analysis of market design: Linking simulation models

A combination of several models with an agent-based simulation is developed in the Marketecture project carried out at Los Alamos National Laboratory (Atkins et al., 2004a; Atkins et al., 2004b). The model framework is made up of an urban population simulation, an agent-based market model and a grid model. The urban population model simulates individuals and locations of electricity demand. The results of the population simulation are used as an input for the model of the electricity market. The demand side is represented by buyer agents who buy electricity on behalf of the consumers. Electricity can be bought via bilateral trade and in a pool market. The supply side consists of single electricity generation units (generators) and sellers selling electricity on behalf of the generators. The main goal of the grid simulation is to integrate the restrictions to the market caused by the electricity grid. A central aspect of Marketecture is the analysis of the efficiency of the market mechanisms. Therefore the markets can be run in a different order of execution and with different market mechanisms. The sellers acting on the market can be run with different trading strategies.

In the given case study, the impacts of three different pool market clearing mechanisms are analysed in combination with different trading strategies. The speciality of the given approach is the combination of the agent-based electricity market simulation, with a power flow model and a population simulation. Another aspect is the integration of several market clearing mechanisms. Consumers are randomly assigned to buyers. A central goal of the given development is to include individual behaviour in a market simulation without endangering the scalability of the model.

2.5 Summary

The analysed literature shows that agent-based simulation can be a useful tool to test market design. In the presented papers, different market settings are tested. Among these are aspects like the order of market execution (Atkins et al., 2004a; Atkins et al. 2004b) or the market clearing. There is a common tendency to enlarge the scope of the simulation. Starting from rather simple models where the electricity demand is integrated by an aggregate demand curve, new systems which integrate demand side bidding have evolved (Bunn and Oliveira, 2001). Another ongoing extension to the existing models is the integration of several markets (e.g. Bunn and Micola, 2005) and the use of external non-agent-based models providing additional functionality for the agent-based simulation (e.g. Atkins et al., 2004a). One remarkable difference between most European projects and the projects carried out in the US, is the importance of a detailed simulation of the electricity grid. While a detailed integration of grid constraints seems to be a crucial aspect in the U.S., transmission constraints are not integrated in most European projects. The ongoing development of increasing the scope of agent-based simulation of electricity markets also increases the requirements on the agents acting on these markets, since the amount of information and coordination that has to be
dealt with increases. A demanding task pointed out among others by Visudhiphan (Visudhiphan, 2003) is the validation of an agent-based simulation, since the required data on real bidding behaviour and market conditions is not available in most cases. A first attempt for the graphical comparison of simulation results to real world prices is given by Bower et al. (Bower et al., 2001).

3. MODELS WITH FOCUS ON AGENT DECISIONS AND LEARNING

This section presents three selected projects which provide some important contributions to the decision-making of agents in electricity markets. The work carried out at Iowa State University develops suitable learning algorithms for the analysis of the electricity market. While the work carried out at Pacific Northwest National Laboratory presents an approach to modelling consumer contract choice, the research presented by Scheidt seeks to enhance the agent choices by the integration of conventional optimisation tools. A totally different way to improve agent-based simulation can be found in the work of Bagnall and Smith focusing on agent architecture and agent learning. An overview of the reviewed literature in this section is given in Figure 4.

Figure 4:
Overview of reviewed papers on agent decisions

(own visualisation)
In order to provide a basis for the discussion of different models dealing with agent-learning, some important terms are explained in the following bullet points.

• **Reinforcement learning**: Agents interact with a dynamic system in a sequential process. Actions are selected to maximize a reward. The probability of successful strategies is increased. (see also Moriarty and Schultz, 1999)

• **Genetic algorithm**: Genetic algorithms are oriented on the concept of evolution. The available strategy space is broken down into strategies consisting of small segments (genes), e.g. the volume bid into the market. Strategies are evaluated according to their fitness - successful ones are selected, and children (new strategies) are created by applying biological principles such as crossover and mutation to the genes. (see also Richter and Sheblé, 1998; Ortiz-Boyer et al., 2005)

• **Learning classifier system**: Learning classifier systems are rule based learning mechanisms which consist of three major components:

  1. A production system which contains rules of action in a given environment (classifier);
  2. A reinforcement method measuring the performance of a rule; and
  3. A rule discovery algorithm which creates new rules (see also Bagnall, 2000a, p.155f).

### 3.1 Analysis of the impact of agent learning on simulation results

An early development of an electricity market simulation is presented by Richter and Sheblé (Richter and Sheblé, 1998). Remarkable aspects of the described approach are the use of a genetic algorithm for social learning and the application of multiple bidding rounds for a one time period of electricity deliveries. After the initialization procedure each trading round starts with a price prediction which can be based on moving average, weighted moving average, exponentially weighted moving average, or linear regression. Bids are calculated on the basis of the price prediction. Thereafter, the auction takes place and is repeated as long as there is electricity to buy or to sell. In a next step the genetic algorithm selects the most profitable parents and replaces the least successful half of the population. Then the cycle is repeated with a new population. Richter and Sheblé describe a test application of the model where one distribution company represents a fixed electricity demand and 24 generators bid on the supply side. Grid constraints are neglected and all generators are characterized by the same generation cost curve (Richter and Sheblé, 1998).

In another case study Koesrindartoto (Koesrindartoto, 2002) analyses the impact of agent learning on market results. He uses a market simulator with buyers and sellers bidding on a market implemented as a discrete double auction. In order to show the impact of agent learning, the market outcomes of bidding at marginal cost or revenue are compared to market results in a simulation where a Roth-Erev reinforcement learning algorithm (Roth and Erev, 1995) is applied with different parameter settings. The results show that the learning algorithm has considerable impact on market results and efficiency. The results also show that the parameter setting for the experimentation parameter of the applied learning algorithm influences the results considerably, leading to the lower market efficiency in case of higher tendencies towards experimentation.
3.2 Application of fundamental models to support agent decisions

Another agent-based simulation project, this one focussing on the German electricity sector, has been carried out at the RWTH Aachen University (Scheidt, 2002; Scheidt and Sebastian 2001). In his PhD thesis, Scheidt describes and implements an agent-based simulation of the German electricity sector which includes some new elements in comparison to the early work carried out at London Business School. New aspects are the simulation of a spot market and an over the counter “OTC” market. The spot market in the given project is modelled as a double-sided auction with a uniform-price settlement market clearing. The OTC market is executed after the spot market.

The described work puts special emphasis on the simulation of the trading preparation which is executed after the initialization phase. Thereby the generation of a load and price forecast play an important role. An interesting aspect of the described model is the use of non-agent-based tools for the provision of data within the agent-based simulation. The load forecast is based on historical data with a randomized error margin of 5% (Scheidt, 2002). The price prognosis can either be based on the method of floating average or an external tool called BoFIT-LP using artificial neuronal networks for the calculation of a price prognosis (Scheidt, 2002). Another important part of the simulation is the provision of data on the generation portfolio which can either be based on an external tool (BoFIT-TEP) for the optimal utilization of a plant portfolio or a merit order curve.

The simulation described by Scheidt is implemented in JAVA using the agent building toolkit ZEUS. It is made up of agents with different roles, representing different functions in the electricity system. Roles within a utility comprise of a pool trader and an OTC trader, as well as auxiliary roles (price and load forecast, daily resource scheduling). Other roles comprise of an auctioneer and a transmission system operator. Although the integration of grid constraints for the calculation of local prices is discussed it is not implemented due to the lower importance in the German market. A central part of the simulation is the trader agents. In contrast to most other analysed models, a trader agent in this model is capable of buying and selling electricity, depending on the utilisation of its power plants. The trader agents are driven by the two goals - to increase their profits continuously, and to ensure a given utilization of the generation of the portfolio. In order to reach their goals the trader agents are endowed with a rule-based algorithm which determines the bid price for the next period. Trading on the spot market is based on generation costs, expected profit margin and acceptable losses in order to ensure plant utilisation. Thereby acceptable losses and margin are part of a reinforcement learning algorithm. In the case of trading on the OTC market, spot market results are taken into consideration when determining the trading strategy.

The author presents short-term simulation results. The simulation is based on synthetic data and does not reflect the real situation of the German electricity market. Plant outages are not taken into account. Despite these simplifications the model results are similar to short term price developments on the German spot market. However, there are still some deviations from real market data and Scheidt points out that a realistic agent-based simulation can have extensive data requirements which can be difficult to satisfy, especially as some of the data is proprietary (Scheidt, 2002).

8 OTC = „over the counter“. Over the counter trades are bilateral trades.
9 For more information on ZEUS see http://sourceforge.net/projects/zeusagent
3.3 Increasing realism by improved agent architecture

Bagnall and Smith present an agent-based simulation of the UK electricity market which considers the market rules in place before 2001. In contrast to the work carried out at London Business School, the work presented by Bagnall and Smith has a stronger focus on the agent architecture (Bagnall and Smith, 2005). Agent learning and bidding strategies are key elements of their developed model. Similar to early stages of the other examples presented above, the presented simulation focuses on the supply side of the electricity market with a given predicted load curve which is represented by typical load characteristics of weekdays and weekends in winter and summer, respectively (Bagnall, 2000a). Deviations from forecast and real load are not taken into account. In contrast to some of the projects presented in this survey, the given model has no physical load flow model of the transmission system. However, the model integrates unit commitment constraints, e.g. minimum and maximum generation levels for each generation unit (Bagnall and Smith, 2000). The market processes are structured in two steps: In a first round, demand and supply are matched in an unconstrained schedule. Thereafter constraints are incorporated into the schedule and a capacity premium for grid balancing is calculated.

Since the agent architecture is the central part of the given project the structure of the agents is rather complex. Their strategy choices are driven by two main goals. The first goal is to avoid losses and the second goal is to maximize the profit. Both goals are represented by an own learning classifier system within the agent. The agent controller has a small memory containing a limited number of past experiences. Other elements of the agent are the detector and effector which are the link to the environment. The described model is applied in case studies to compare a pay as bid market clearing to a uniform market clearing (Bagnall and Smith, 2005) and the analysis of different constraint levels (Bagnall and Smith, 2000). Another important aspect of the case study is the analysis of agent behaviour which exhibits realistic bidding for generation units (Bagnall, 2000b), and a realistic market volatility (Bagnall and Smith, 2005).

3.4 Integration of the consumer perspective: Consumer contract choice

An interesting project with stronger focus on the consumer perspective in electricity markets is the work carried out at Pacific Northwest National Laboratory. Roop and Fathelrahmann describe a model which combines a distribution grid model with a contract choice model focussing on residential consumers (Roop and Fathelrahmann, 2003). In the cited article the consumer choice between fixed tariffs and time dependent tariffs is analysed. In order to simulate consumer contract choice, a modified Roth-Erev learning algorithm is used. The consumer decision process is structured as follows. Every month the consumer agents receive their bills. In order to initiate further thought on contract choice the bill has to be higher than expected. The next hurdle is the actual difference between the expected bill and the actual bill. Only if the difference exceeds a certain value, the consumer will seek other contract options. Based on the available alternatives the consumer will calculate the expected savings. If the expected savings exceed a certain threshold the consumer updates his propensity to change contracts and eventually changes contracts if the propensity to change contracts reaches a threshold value. The propensity to change contract is also influenced by a forgetting parameter and an experimentation parameter which characterizes consumers. Due
to the variety of parameters influencing the consumer contract choice the calibration of these parameters is an important issue. In the paper, different parameter settings are analysed showing that the expected savings threshold seems to be the most important factor within the described model. The planned extension of the model seeks to integrate different consumer types, load serving entities and generators bidding on different markets (Roop and Fathelrahmann, 2004).

In another recent publication, inspired by the work carried out at Pacific Northwest National Laboratory, a simulation of the German retail market for private consumers is presented by Müller et al. (Müller et al., 2007). The developed algorithm for the simulation of household behaviour is similar to the study presented above. It is calibrated to the real world market developments. Households and profit maximising suppliers interact on the retail market. The authors can show that current market participation of household consumers may be too low to keep market prices on a competitive level.

3.5 Summary

The examples above have contributed to the development of agent decisions in three different ways. The project carried out at Pacific National Lab integrates consumer contract choice into the simulation of electricity markets. In order to simulate this decision process a new algorithm is presented. The work presented by Scheidt shows that it can be useful to integrate conventional optimisation tools and forecasting tools based on neuronal networks to support agent decisions. Another possibility to enhance agent decision processes as presented by Bagnall and his colleagues, is the improvement of agent architecture, e.g. by the use of learning classifier systems which enable the agents to pursue more than one goal. The work presented by Koesrindartoto shows that the choice of the learning algorithm has a considerable impact on the results. A common tendency in recent work seems to be the use of individual learning algorithms instead of social learning. In general it can be stated the current literature shows that the effort to increase the complexity of agent’s architecture and decision processes leads to a less detailed representation of real world market conditions, e.g. the integration of grid constraints. In the current status of the research, learning algorithms, which are able to explore more strategies and provide a higher pro-activeness of the agents, like the work of Bagnall et. al. (chapter 3.2), seem not to be able to model a high system complexity like established energy system models or simulation models with less intelligent agents. Nevertheless the usage of more detailed learning algorithms (as done in the work of Bagnall et. al.) can be a valuable stream of research for the integration of a more realistic representation of agent behaviour into simulation platforms.

4. MODELS FOR THE COUPLING OF LONG-TERM AND SHORT-TERM SIMULATIONS

This section presents three selected projects which focus on the coupling of several short-term decisions and long-term decisions. In contrast to the models concentrating on short term markets these projects envisage the integration of a long-term perspective such as capacity expansion planning. In the analysed literature the proposed simulation platforms also include several markets in one simulation. One project in this field is carried out at the Argonne National Laboratory. The current work of the Fraunhofer Institute and the Universität Karlsruhe seeks to develop a model which is capable of integrating aspects related to emission
trading and the expansion of renewable electricity generation as well as the long-term investment decisions of conventional power plants. Another project currently under development is the work carried out at CSIRO Australia which can draw on an extensive market database. A striking example for the possible integration of agent-based simulation into macroeconomic analysis is the Aspen-EE model developed at Sandia National Laboratories. An overview of the reviewed literature is given in Figure 5.

**Figure 5:**
Overview of the reviewed literature in chapter four

4.1 Development of an agent-based simulation with multiple time scales

In North, 2001 an integrated long-term-model of the electric power and natural gas markets is presented, focussing on interdependencies between these markets. The model, SMART II+ consists of a set of agents and interconnections representing the electric power marketing and transmission infrastructure as well as the natural gas marketing and distribution infrastructure. Market participants are producers and consumers. Both producers and consumers have an initial investment capital, which can increase through profit and decrease through losses. Reaching a certain level of investment capital offers the possibility of purchasing additional production capacity or growing in form of new consumers. Natural gas fired electric generators derive their costs from the natural gas market. These generators are
consumers in the natural gas marketplace. Main results are that natural gas fired electrical generators are highly competitive, which causes an increasing market share. A rising market share radically increases market interdependence, because both markets compete for the same underlying resource, natural gas.

An outgrowth of the early SMART II+ project which combines detailed modelling of the electricity grid with an agent-based simulation of power markets is the Electricity Markets Complex Adaptive System [EMCAS] developed at Argonne National Laboratory (Conzelmann et al., 2004). In addition to a spot market and a bilateral market for electricity, EMCAS also simulates four markets for the grid regulation which represent the different levels of reserves ranging from the primary AGC regulation to the replace reserve.

In order to analyse the impact of different market pricing mechanisms, EMCAS is able to simulate a uniform-price market clearing and a pay-as-bid pricing rule (North et al., 2002b). Another interesting aspect about EMCAS is that it is designed to simulate decisions on six different time scales ranging from real time dispatch of power plants to multi-year planning (Veselka et al., 2002). The electricity demand in EMCAS is represented by consumer agents who are supplied by demand companies. Consumer agents can switch their supplier or decrease electricity demand. Demand companies purchase electricity and sell it to consumers. The supply side of the model is represented by generation companies that own generators representing power plants, and decide on bidding strategies and the operation of these plants. The grid operation is represented by transmission companies and distribution companies. Distribution companies operate and charge for the use of the distribution grid while transmission companies only charge for the use of the transmission system. The efficient operation of the transmission system and the different markets is the central task of the independent system operator/regional transmission provider (ISO/RTO). A special event generator can be used to simulate unforeseen developments like plant outages. The user can specify different market rules and parameters which are represented by the regulator agent.

Another remarkable aspect of EMCAS is the design of the agents with regard to decision processes and agent learning. Conzelmann describes the agents as “thick” agents due to their complexity (North et al., 2002a). They try to maximize a multi-objective utility function which includes risk preferences and other goals like minimum profit or market share (Veselka et al., 2002). The actual objectives vary depending on the agent. The objectives are represented by a minimum expected value, a maximum expected value, and a risk preference. There are several activities carried out by a generation company. One important module is the generation of a price forecast which is based on the available information on the electric system and historical prices. Another module calculates the unit commitment on the available markets. This information is used to calculate the expected utility of a given strategy. Past experiences are used to determine new strategies. The agent learning concept in EMCAS is based on an individual learning algorithm seeking to integrate the concept of exploration-based learning and observation-based learning.

In the reviewed case studies EMCAS has been used to analyse the impact of various conditions on market prices. Among these are bidding strategies, the impact of grid limitations on market prices and the impact of different market clearing mechanisms.

4.2 Integration of emission calculations into a multi-time-scale simulation
The Commonwealth Scientific and Industrial Research Organisation (CSIRO) has developed an agent-based simulation with goals similar to the work carried out at Argonne National Lab. One similarity between EMCAS and NEMSIM is the goal to simulate decisions on different time scales reaching from plant dispatch to multi-year planning. Other similarities are the integration of a grid simulation and the trade on spot and OTC markets. In addition to the concept of EMCAS it is planned to integrate a greenhouse gas emission calculator (Batten et al., 2005). Currently, the model is still under construction and to the knowledge of the authors, no results have yet been published for this simulation model. However, the model development can be based on information for six years of trading on the Australian electricity market (Graham, 2004).

4.3 Integration of investment decisions, CO$_2$-emission trading and renewable support schemes

Since 2000/2001 at the University of Karlsruhe and the Fraunhofer Institute of Karlsruhe, several approaches of agent-based energy models have been designed. Among these are concepts presented by Göbelt (Göbelt, 2001) and Fichtner (Fichtner et al., 2003). These concepts seek to combine agent-based simulation with linear optimisation models. Another aspect proposed by Fichtner (Fichtner et al., 2003) is the integration of long term decisions such as investment into power plants. A more comprehensive simulation of electricity markets and the integration of long-term decisions is proposed by Czernohous et al. (Czernohous et al., 2003). In addition to investment planning it proposed to use optimisation techniques also for plant dispatch and trade preparation which is similar to the work presented by Scheidt (Scheidt, 2002). A new aspect is the concept of a regulatory agent seeking to reduce emissions of harmful substances.

In 2004 a new project started in Karlsruhe: PowerACE. The aim of this project is to simulate the development of the German electricity and certificate market under the conditions of the liberalised electricity market as well as the promotion of renewable energy and the new CO$_2$-emission trading (see Weidlich et al. 2005, Genoese et al. 2005). Market players, like power generating companies or operators of renewable energy, are split into diverse agents (Weidlich et al., 2005) and each agent carries out one or more functions like plant dispatch or trading. On the demand side the consumer agents representing different sectors negotiate contracts with the supplier agents. The result of this negotiation process is that all consumers and their corresponding load profiles are assigned to suppliers by contracts. Based on the knowledge about their contracted load the suppliers purchase the required electricity on the power markets via buyers. The sellers generate bids according to their merit order curve, including start-up cost of plants (Sensfuss and Genoese 2006). Renewables bid at zero price to simulate the guaranteed feed in according to the German Renewable Energy Sources Act (see also EEG 2004). The agent AuctioneerEEX matches the bids of the bidders using the European Energy Exchange Clearing mechanism (see also EEX 2005) and returns the results. Capacities can both be sold on the spot market and/or the balancing power market.

For long-term analysis, the development of the German power plant capacities is simulated. The power plant portfolio is updated once per year. At the moment, capacity extension is realised via a soft link to the linear optimisation model PERSEUS-ZERT (see also Enzensberger, 2003). Endogenous investment decisions for renewable power plants and conventional power plants are modelled separately with the investment planner agent.
Decisions of this agent will modify the power plant portfolio and thus influence i.e. the short-term trading decision (Genoese et al., 2005). The model is implemented in Java and uses RePast, the Recursive Porous Agent Simulation Toolkit (North et al. 2006). In one case study it is shown that the model is able to produce realistic spot market results on an hourly level (Sensfuss and Genoese, 2006). In another case study the model is used to assess the CO2-savings by renewable energy sources (Genoese et al., 2005).

In (Weidlich and Veit 2006) the interplay between a day-ahead market for physical delivery contracts and a day-ahead minute reserve market is analysed. Generators are modelled as adaptive agents that apply an Erev-Roth type reinforcement learning algorithm. At any one market, generators integrate opportunity costs that arise from the foregone opportunity of selling their capacity in the other market into their reinforcement. The authors find that the order of market execution influences prices on both markets.

In a recent study (Genoese et al. 2007) the developed simulation platform is applied to analyse the capability of generators to integrate the opportunity cost for CO2 allowances into market prices. The model is calibrated and the simulation results are compared to real world market prices in different scenarios representing different integration factors for the different fuels. The authors can show that it most of the opportunity cost for CO2 allowances is integrated into market prices. This is especially the case for gas and hard coal fired plants.

4.4 Integration of macroeconomic aspects

The agent-based simulation called Aspen-EE developed at Sandia National Laboratories seeks to analyse the impact of market structures and power outages in the electricity sector on the economy (Barton et al., 2000). In addition to the ability to model several power markets it simulates the labour market and the product market. The electricity demand is modelled with industry, household and commercial agents. Besides their common task to purchase and consume electricity, the agents carry out other functions such as producing goods or paying taxes. In addition to the common agents in an electricity market simulation, i.e. generation companies and an independent system operator, a fuel company agent is introduced which sells fuel to the generation companies. The infrastructure of the simulation is supported by a bulletin board for public information, a disaster agent and weather agent determining power outages and demand development. The price setting of the agents is based on a genetic learning classifier system [GLACS] (see also Basu et al., 1996). While commercial agents and fuel company agents are charged a fixed price for electricity, industry agents actively bid on the market. The government agent collects taxes and pays unemployment benefits. During power outages perishable goods decay and work productivity is reduced. In a case study the capabilities of the model are shown in a model run with two markets in order to analyse the impact of price caps.

4.5 Summary

The projects presented above are very complex in their scope. Proposed aspects are the coupling of several markets like spot market and balancing power markets. In order to be able to trade successfully on several markets the agents involved in the simulation tend to become more complex. Another factor increasing the complexity of the discussed models is the
integration of aspects like consumer contract choice and investment. Since the decisions take place in different time horizons, the coordination of agents acting on different time scales within the simulations is necessary. In order to provide realistic results the discussed models require extensive data ranging from information on corporate details concerning demand load curves as well as precise power plant data. Although the models discussed above are still under development, first simulation runs of EMCAS and PowerACE show that the development of these large scale projects is on its way.

5. CONCLUSIONS

Although the concept of agent-based simulation of electricity markets is a rather new development the reviewed literature shows considerable progress in the development of different simulation models within the last five years. Starting from simple models with aggregated demand curves and few supply bidders on one market, the development has continued to concepts of large scale simulation platforms which are capable of dealing with multiple markets and time scales. An overview of the developments in four selected categories with examples of the reviewed literature is given in Figure 6.

![Figure 6: Examples for the increasing complexity of agent-based simulations](own visualisation)

However, the development of an agent-based simulation of electricity markets is a demanding task. There are several challenges to the development of agent-based simulations.
A first issue is the development of an adequate agent architecture and the use of suitable learning algorithms since experiences of recent projects have shown that the learning algorithm has considerable impact on the results (Koesrindartoto, 2002). In the reviewed literature the application of complex learning algorithms in agent-based models has an impact on the realism of the representation of real market conditions. In general, two streams of research can be observed. Some authors (Scheidt, 2002; Genoese et al. 2007) focus on a detailed technical and economic representation of real world market conditions while following a weak definition of the term agent. The central goal of this approach is to provide quantitative results. Another stream of research focuses on the simulation of agent behaviour and market structures which is more suitable for qualitative analyses (Bagnall 2000a, Koesrindartoto 2002).

Another important issue is the provision of data as a basis for agent decisions. Thereby the use of conventional models, e.g. optimisation models for the utilisation of the plant portfolio as a source of data for agent decisions, has been successful (Scheidt, 2002). A difference between most developments in the USA and Europe is the importance of the integration of grid constraints. While the integration of grid constraints is a crucial issue to most projects carried out in the USA it is less important in most European projects focussing on national markets due to the differences in the existing infrastructure. However, rising electricity demand and the integration of large scale offshore wind energy also raises grid issues in Europe (DENA, 2005).

As the concept of agent-based simulation is applied to large scale simulation platforms models such as EMCAS, PowerACE or NEMSIM, the requirements on the data and agent architecture increase considerably, ranging from detailed electricity market and load data to future power plant options. Thereby it has to be stated that a common challenge to all agent-based simulations in electricity markets is the validation of simulation results. This is an important issue which needs more attention in the current research. In most of the reviewed papers the validation process is limited to a qualitative discussion. None of the reviewed papers applies a thorough validation procedure for a comparison of simulation results with real market data. However some papers, such as (Bower et al., 2001, Scheidt, 2002), show a graphical comparison of results and real world development. In order to gain more acceptance by the modelling community, it might be valuable to support the graphical comparison by statistical indicators. A first attempt is presented by Sensfuß and Genoese (Sensfuß, Genoese, 2006; Genoese et al., 2007) showing a promising approach which needs further refinement. Another issue is the validation of the behaviour of single agents which is a demanding task in itself. Thereby the analysis of agent decisions such as consumer contract choice or investment decisions may require considerable efforts to improve the empirical data basis.

Despite all of the challenges, the results of the reviewed literature show that the concept of agent-based simulation as a test bed for the electricity sector can provide additional insights for market and policy design.
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